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REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE "FACTS" RELEVANT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND AT TRIAL 
ARE THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AS DETERMINED BY THE 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Ms. Jones in her Brief cites only to certain findings of fact that the District Court 
chose to include in its ruling and order and claims that only those "facts" are relevant to this 
Court's inquiry (Ms. Jones Brief, p. 6). However, the relevant factual record in this case 
includes all undisputed facts supporting summary judgment in addition to relevant 
uncontested facts at trial, which demand judgment as a matter of law. For example, Ms. 
Jones pled in her complaint that Cheryl Barlow is a fit parent. In addition, there is no dispute 
of fact that Cheryl Barlow is the natural biological mother of the child. Cheryl Barlow's 
argument has consistently been that judgment should be entered in her favor irrespective of 
the District Court's formal Findings of Fact. 
Contrary to Ms. Jones' claims, the undisputed facts in support of Cheryl Barlow's 
motion for summary judgment are relevant to the issue of whether summary judgment was 
incorrectly denied. For purposes of assessing whether the District Court erred in law in 
failing to grant summary judgment, this Court must accept as true all statements of material 
facts that were not controverted with admissible evidence. See generally, Celotex Corp. v. 
CatretU 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Courts must look to the substantive law to determine which 
facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,248 (1986). 
A trial court's formal findings may or may not be material to the asserted legal claims. 
The factual statements in Cheryl Barlow's affidavit in support of summary judgment were 
not controverted with admissible evidence and such facts require judgment in Cheryl 
Barlow's favor as a matter of law. These facts, as stated in Cheryl Barlow's affidavit, are 
as follows: 
1. I am the natural and biological mother of the minor child, Gracie Lynne Barlow, born 
October 4,2001 and the only custodial parent. 
2. Plaintiff, Keri Lynne Jones has no biological or blood relationship to the child in any 
manner. 
3. The same parties to this litigation filed a petition for guardianship on about April 
2002 in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. On May 1, 2002, the 
Court entered an order appointing Cheryl Barlow and Keri Jones as co-guardians (See 
In Re G.5, Case No. 023900497). 
4. At the time I was residing with Plaintiff, I was very familiar with Utah law regarding 
adoption, which does not confer any parental rights upon an unmarried cohabitating 
partner, regardless of their sexual orientation. For this reason I never believed or 
intended that Plaintiff would be able to obtain parental rights to my child regardless 
of the status of our relationship. 
5. The parties to this litigation resided together in a same-sex relationship from about 
February 2001 through November 7, 2003. 
6. The relationship between the parties ended in October 2003 when Plaintiff admitted 
she was having an affair with another woman since about July 2003. 
7. During this time period, Plaintiff became increasingly unfriendly toward the minor 
child, resulting in the child crying and objecting to being with Plaintiff. 
8. The parties have not resided together in any manner since November 7,2003. 
9. On November 24,2003,1 filed a Verified Petition for Removal of co-guardianship of 
Keri Lynne Jones of the minor child. In that Petition, I asserted that I was the sole 
parent of the minor child. 
10. Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Petition on December 22,2003, denying that I was 
the sole parent of the minor child. Plaintiff further sought "an immediate order of 
visitation." 
11. Third District Court Judge Paul G. Maughan entered his order on April 21, 2004, 
removing Jones as the guardian of the minor child. The Court further ruled, "All 
duties previously performed by said co-guardian shall revert to the natural mother and 
sole parent of the minor child, Cheryl Pike Barlow." 
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12. No written or legal documents are in force or effect which tie Plaintiff to the minor 
child or otherwise give Plaintiff any legal interest in the minor child. 
13. Plaintiff has not had any significant contact with the minor child since about 
November 2003. 
14. I have been the primary care-giver of the minor child since the child was born. 
15. It is my opinion that it is not in the best interests of my minor child to have ongoing 
visitation or continued contact with Plaintiff 
16. The last time my minor child saw Plaintiff, in late 2003, she asked who Plaintiff was 
and acted like she did not know her. The minor child has not expressed any loss or 
harm from not seeing or having contact with Plaintiff. 
17. The minor child is doing very well in all respects in my custody and care and does not 
have any emotionally or physical problems to my knowledge. 
R. 388-90, Affidavit of Cheryl Barlow. Based upon the above, judgment as a matter of law 
should have been entered by the District Court based upon each ground stated in both the 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. 
The formal findings of fact entered by the District Court after each trial, on the other 
hand, are superfluous to the legal claims continuously raised by the natural mother. For 
example, it does not matter whether the judge believes the child will "benefit financially1 and 
emotionally" if the relationship is re-established between the three-year old child and Ms. 
Jones. R. 774, f 5-8. Not one of the Findings of Fact by the District Court h^s any effect 
on the legal defenses raised in the pre-trial motions and at trial by Cheryl Barlow. The Court 
must, therefore, accept all undisputed facts which are material to the legal defenses asserted 
by Cheryl Barlow on summary judgment and at trial. 
Although Cheryl Barlow's income of $40,000 per year should be considered more than 
adequate to support her and her child, it was another legal error for the court to base its "best 
interest of the child analysis'5 on whether the child will "benefit financially and emotionally" in that 
arguably every child could "benefit" from more money and more emotional involvement. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
A. The Complaint is Jurisdictional Defective: 
Ms. Jones fails to address the fact that her pleadings are defective in that they fail to 
reference any common law cause of action (i.e. in loco parentis), but in fact improperly 
reference the divorce statutes. While it is true that Utah has "notice pleading/' such fact does 
not excuse a party from the requirement of alleging sufficient legal and factual bases for 
jurisdiction. Ms. Jones' complete lack of any legal basis for standing in her complaint 
required dismissal. The District Court Judge, therefore, erred in law when he overruled the 
Commissioner's recommendation to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. 
B. Utah Common Law and Historical Statutes Do Not Support Application of 
in Loco Parentis Standing in this Case: 
Ms. Jones cannot cite to a single Utah case or historical statute which upholds the 
trial court's conclusion that in loco parentis may be applied to factual situations similar to 
this case, yet she goes so far to say that Utah Legislative enactments that foreclose standing 
in this case allegedly violate the "open courts clause" of the Utah Constitution (Appellee's 
Brf., p. 10, fii. 2). However, if no common law rights to a minor child were available to a 
former homosexual partner at common law, then the Legislature is free to foreclose such 
rights by statutes to unmarried partners, especially when one partner is not a parent of the 
child. When reviewing a purported common law right, the first question for the Court to ask 
is whether the Court's prior decisions grant similar rights based upon a similar fact pattern. 
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Since no Utah cases address the rights of a former same-sex non-parent partner to a 
child at common law, the Court should first consider the common law rights of a "live-in 
boyfriend," in a non-marital situation in that Ms. Jones is certainly not entitled to more rights 
than a live-in boyfriend who is the natural father at common law. Counsel is not aware of 
any cases and Ms. Jones has not cited to any, giving rights to live-in boyfriends as a class of 
persons against the objections of a fit custodial mother. To the contrary, putative fathers, had 
no rights to the child at common law. Thomas v. Children's Aid Society, 364 P.2d 1029, 
1031 (Utah 1961). Although this case was overruled by statutory changes in Utah's 
adoption laws, it is very insightful as to the historical standing of putative fathers in Utah. 
In Thomas, the putative father lived with the mother at around the time of conception 
and actually married her before the child was born, but after the child was placed for 
adoption. Id. at 1030. Since Thomas was not divorced from his first wife, however, the 
marriage was considered void as a matter of Utah statutory law, Thomas, therefore, occupied 
the position of a live-in boyfriend. The court held, 
The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies no recognized paternal status at 
common law or under our statutes, nlO. The law does not recognize him at all, except 
that it will make him pay for the child's maintenance if it can find out who he is, nl 1. 
The only father it recognizes as having any rights is the father of a legitimate child. 
n.12. 
Id. at 1031-32- The court in Thomas rejected constitutional claims of the unwed father.2 Id. 
Under Thomas and prior cases, there is no doubt that a live-in boyfriend, who is not a 
biological father, had no rights or standing to seek visitation against the rights of a natural 
2The U.S. Supreme Court began acknowledging the constitutional rights of unwed 
biological fathers in about 1972. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
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mother at common law. A legal, but non-biological, father on the other hand, had standing 
to seek visitation and custody as discussed in In re J. W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). 
Under Utah common law, a live-in boyfriend, who is the biological father, did not 
obtain standing to seek custody or visitation of his own child until after 1965, when the Utah 
Legislature enacted the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l. See In re 
State in the Interests ofM, 467 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (1970). Based upon this statutory duty 
of support, the court in the Interests ofMreasoned that a "statutory parent-child relationship 
has been established between the publically acknowledge child and his putative father" 
which gives the putative father standing to seek custody and control of a child against "all 
but the mother." Id. at 1017.3 The dissent, accurately stated the previously-understood 
common law by noting, "the illegitimate father is not a parent within the meaning of the 
law." (Emphasis in original) Id. at 1018. It was the Legislative enactment regarding the 
duty of support of unwed fathers that became the impetus for acknowledging any rights at 
all of live-in boyfriends rather than some common law right 
The legal duty to financially support children was in fact an underlying basis of this 
Court's acknowledgment of standing inln re 1 W.E, 799 P.2d 710,716 (Utah 1990). J. W.R 
acknowledged the statutory, rather than common law, duty of a step-parent to support his 
spouse's children during their marriage, citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 (1987) and 
similarly to in the Interests ofM, re-affirmed the notion that a duty of support can serve as 
3The mother had previously relinquished her parental rights when she put the child 
up for adoption; therefore, the legal battle was between the putative father and the 
adoptive parents;. The common law always acknowledged the rights of an unwed mother 
as being supreme so long as she was a fit custodial parent. 
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a basis for standing for a non-biological parent. The District Court in this case tacitly 
acknowledged the importance of child support in conferring standing upon a non-parent by 
actually ordering Ms. Jones to pay child support, life insurance, and division of medial 
insurance premiums and expenses. However, making such orders after conferring standing 
cannot remedy the fatal fact that Ms. Jones had absolutely no duty to support Cheryl 
Barlow's child at law or common law during or after their failed relationship. At both 
common law and under Utah statues, a live-in boyfriend has no duty of support and, hence, 
no right to visitation or custody. Ms. Jones certainly does not occupy a better position in 
terms of standing to seek visitation than a live-in boyfriend, especially against the objections 
of the natural mother. 
While the Utah common law gave no rights to an unmarried father, it gave the highest 
legal position to the rights of unwed mothers against all others so long as the mother was a 
fit custodial parent. See the Interests ofM, 364 P.2d 1016, citing with approval a New 
Jersey decision holding that the rights of a father who is obligated to pay child support "is 
not as great as that of the mother...." That Court further cited approvingly an A.L.R. citation 
which states, 
The putative father of an illegitimate child is entitled to its custody and control 
as against all but the mother....(Emphasis added). 
Id at 1017. Therefore, while the right of an unmarried father historically stems from the 
legislatively-created duty of child support, the rights of an unwed natural mother have never 
been diminished in the State of Utah. Even presently, Utah law does not guarantee an 
unmarried biological father parent-time rights, but only if the court considers it "appropriate 
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under the circumstances.55 Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10.5 (2005). This statute further 
implies that the unwed mother has a far greater right to custody and control of her 
illegitimate child than does the natural unwed father. These superior rights of an unwed 
mother undoubtedly arise from the incredible sacrifice a mother makes in carrying a child 
to term, breast-feeding, nourishing, and nurturing her child. This is especially true in this 
day and age when mother's have a right to abort their children and are often encouraged to 
do so when they are not married. 
There is no reason to dilute or undermine these natural maternal rights in the context 
of a failed same-sex relationship. Ms. Jones does not occupy a legal or factual position that 
is superior than a "live-in boyfriend55 who is the natural father. Undoubtedly many "live-in 
boyfriends55 made commitments to raise their girlfriend's child similar to any commitment 
Ms. Jones may have made. Both Utah common law and statutory law have never 
acknowledged these commitments as enforceable against the rights of a natural mother. This 
Court should, therefore, treat Ms. Jones as a live-in boyfriend who is not the biological 
father. Under such circumstances, Ms. Jones has no rights to or duties to the child. 
In addition, since a live-in boyfriend, who is the natural father, had no automatic 
rights to the child prior to legislative enactments, the Legislature is free to preclude further 
rights in the area of both unmarried same-sex and opposite sex cohabitating couples without 
violating the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. It fiirther means that this Court 
should consider Utah's Defense of Marriage Act and the adoption statutes as instructive that 
the Legislature has acted in a way to prevent visitation rights being extended to unwed 
partners who are not related to the child. 
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C. The Utah Cases Relied Upon By Ms. Jones Do Not Support Standing: 
Cheryl Barlow firmly believes this case can and should be decided based upon Utah 
law. Both parties can cite cases from other states which disagree on what acknowledgment, 
if any, a court should give to unmarried cohabitating relationships. In support of her 
argument, Ms. Jones relies almost exclusively upon three Utah cases to the exclusion of other 
informative and related cases: Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P. 2d 64 (1978); In re J. W.F., 799 
P.2d 710 (Utah 1990); and Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307 (Utah App. 2001). These cases all 
involved marital issues either as a legal father and/or a step father and/or pending Juvenile 
Court petitions to terminate parental rights and they all actually support Cheryl Barlow's 
claims. While they reference the common law concept of in loco parentis, they are 
incorrectly applied by Ms. Jones and the trial court as follows: 
1. Searle v. Searle Supports Cheryl Barlow's Claims: 
In her Brief on page 10, Ms. Jones cites to Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307 (Utah App. 
2001) for the idea that the grandparents "had standing both because they were in loco 
parentis to the child and based upon Sections 30-5-2 and 30-3-5/' (Emphasis in original 
brief). This statement, however, cannot be found in Searle. Instead, the opinion holds, 
Grandparents had the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard due to their status 
as paternal grandparents and temporary custodians under the district court's 
temporary custody order, thus acting in loco parentis. 
Id. at 319. In Searle, the mother and father of the child were divorced and the father was the 
legal father in that the child was bom during the marriage.4 The divorce decree gave both 
4Utah statutes and Appellate Courts have a long tradition of consistently legitimizing 
children bom during a marital relationship. The policy is the opposite for children bom during a 
non-marital relationship. 
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parties "joint legal custody." Id. at 311. The "Father" died while the child was in his 
physical custody. The grandparents took physical custody and filed a petition in Juvenile 
Court to terminate the natural mother's parental rights based upon abandonment of the child. 
The Juvenile Court granted the Grandparents temporary custody based upon the pending 
termination petition. Id. It was this temporary custody order upon which the court in Searle 
based its conclusion that the Grandparents had a due process right to notice of a collateral 
tribal court order. The child was in the Grandparents actual physical custody based upon a 
Juvenile Court order. Searle supports Cheryl Barlow's argument that a non-parent can have 
standing to assert claims to a child in Juvenile Court, pending a petition to terminate parental 
rights. 
2. In re /• W.F. Supports Cheryl Barlow's Claims: 
In re J. W.F, 799 P.2d 710, relied upon by the court, arose out of a step-parent claim 
by a "legal father." In the Court's own words: 
The central question before us is what rights, including custodial rights, a 
husband has in a child bom into his marriage who is not his biological 
offspring. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 712. More importantly, the court did not base its conclusion that the father had 
standing based upon in loco parentis. In fact the short discussion about in loco parentis is 
dicta is found in one footnote. Id. at 715, fn 5. The father in J. W.F. was granted standing 
because he was a "step-parent." He did not need to additionally show he was in loco 
parentis because of the statutory, rather than a common law, duty to support the child as a 
step-parent based upon (Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6) (Supp. 1990)). Id. 
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The case was brought in the context of a Juvenile Court petition to terminate the 
parental rights of both the natural mother and father for abuse and neglect. The Court found 
the child to be "neglected and abandoned/' Id. at 712. In this context, the Court cited 
Wilson v. Family Services Div., Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 230 (Utah 1976) for support that 
a non-parent next of kin relative has "some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the 
custody and welfare of the children who become parentless. so that they may come forward 
and assert their claim." (Emphasis added) Id. at 231. J.W.F. then states, "According to 
Wilson, inchoate rights entitle the relative to standing to such a hearing to determine 
custodial fitness." (Emphasis added). J.W.F. 710 P.2d at 715. The underlying petition 
before the court in Wilson was the unfitness of the parents. Since "custodial fitness" was at 
issue in Wilson, the "dormant" or "inchoate" rights of the next of kin became operative and 
active, entitling them to standing. The mandatory inference is that prior to the allegations 
that a child is parentless or of unfit parents, the rights of the next of kin remain dormant. 
In this case, Ms. Jones cannot rely upon the reasoning of J.W.F. unless and until 
Cheryl Jones is proved to be an unfit or deceased mother. In addition, to unfitness, she 
would additional have to be a step-parent, legal father, or near relative. Much has been made 
by Ms. Jones to another footnote in J. W.F. which seems to open the door for non-parents to 
have standing. However, that footnote cannot be divorced from the context of the Juvenile 
Court proceedings where the rights of the parents were terminated. The relevant footnote 
states, 
it is conceivable that persons who are not related by blood or marriage, although not 
presumptively entitled to standing, could show that they had a relationship with the 
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child that would warrant a grant of standing. We have no such situation before us 
today. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 715, fn. 4. The emphasized word, "conceivable" clarifies that it would be an 
extraordinary situation and that the general understanding prevails that a person not related 
by blood or marriage is presumptively not entitled to standing. Just prior to footnote 4, 
however, the court states that a person's "legal relationship" to a child is more important than 
whether a legal duty to support the child exists. Id. at 715. Footnote 4, although dicta, could 
only apply in the context of parental unfitness or some other scenario where the parents are 
dead or otherwise not able or willing to care for their child. 
In J. W.F., the legal father was not a relative of the child, but he had the requisite 
"legal relationship" to obtain standing (i.e. step-parent). The parents' rights were terminated. 
Ms. Jones' claims, on the other hand, are against the rights of a fit custodial parent. If Ms. 
Jones were a relative, her rights would be considered dormant under both J. W.F. and Wilson. 
Since she is not a relative, she needed some other "legal relationship." It was undisputed that 
Ms. Jones has no legal relationship with the child apart from the claimed in loco parentis 
argument. When this lack of "legal relationship," as stated in J. W.F., was brought to the trial 
court's attention, the court stated that the Vermont civil union was the legal relationship. 
R. 912, Tr. 454:5 through 455:25. However, Utah law, does not recognize a Vermont civil 
union, especially in the context of conferring step-parent status for purposes of standing. 
3. Gribble v. Gribble Supports Cheryl Barlows' Claims: 
Gribble v. Gribble, like other Utah Supreme Court cases, does not stand as an island, 
but must always be read and applied in the context of prior and following cases of this Court. 
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For example, J. W.F. discusses and explains the holding in Gribble as being based upon the 
step-parent status of the father stating, 
The court in Gribble actually required that the stepparent stand in loco parentis to the 
child before he would be granted a hearing. The court was interpreting Utah Code 
Ann.§ 30-3-5 (1953), as amended, which state that, 'Visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child." 
J. W.F., 799 P.2d at 715. The court in J. W.F. refers to Gribble as a stepparent case based 
upon Utah divorce laws. Id. As construed by J. W.F., step-parent status was necessary in 
Gribble, but not sufficient to gain standing. The step-parent status in Gribble provided the 
necessary legal relationship, but he also needed to prove a factual relationship of in loco 
parentis. 
Moreover, J. W.F. favorably cited Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38,41 (Utah 
1982) for the proposition that the status of a step-parent can provide a basis for standing 
regarding visitation issues of a minor child. J. W.F. referred to Hutchinson as providing the 
factors to consider in determining the best interests of a child. J. W.F. 799 P.2d at 715-716. 
Hutchinson, however, required that a step-parent overcome the parental presumption before 
the court could even consider the best interests of the child in determining the visitation 
rights of a step-parent. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38, 40-41 (Utah 1982). 
Certainly Gribble, decided in 1978, cannot overrule Hutchinson, which was decided four 
years later. Therefore, Gribble does not create any new rights for a non-parent to seek 
visitation nor does it obviate the necessity that a non-parent must first rebut the parental 
presumption before a court can evaluate whether visitation is in the child's best interests. 
It merely stands for the proposition that in a divorce context, a step-parent may obtain 
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standing to seek visitation based upon Utah's divorce laws that allow a relative to seek 
visitation in a divorce proceeding. Furthermore, based upon J. W.F. and Wilson, a non-
parent's rights to seek in loco parentis standing is dormant until the natural parent is unable 
or unwilling to care for the child. Only then, will a non-parent stand in the position of a 
relative to the child for purposes of custody or visitation. 
D. Overcoming the Parental Presumption is a Prerequisite to Standing: 
Ms. Jones completely fails to address Utah's requirement that a non-parent must 
overcome the parental presumption before a court may consider the best interests of the 
child. Noticeably absent in Ms. Jones' brief is any reference or discussion of Hutchinson 
v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38. 
In Hutchinson, the parties married in 1975 seven months after the mother gave birth 
to Lacy. Two other children were bom during the marriage, but the parties divorced in 1980. 
The husband was named as the Father on the birth certificate of Lacy, he treated the child 
in "every way" as his own, and Lacy "considers him her father both psychologically and 
biologically." Id. at 40. The trial court granted the husband custody of all three children. 
Although neglect of the children by the natural mother was shown at trial, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the decision because the trial court failed to first require the husband to rebut 
the mother's parental presumption. 
Without a doubt, Ms. Jones does not stand in a stronger position either legally or 
factually than did the husband in Hutchinson. The fact that Lacy was five years old and had 
two younger siblings who were born during a lawful marriage were certainly compelling 
factors to the court. However, theses facts were not sufficient to overlook and ignore the 
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parental presumption in Hutchinson. Ms. Jones, on the other hand, was never the step-
parent of Grade Lynn Barlow. The birth certificate never referenced Ms. Jones as a parent 
and since 2003, it has not referenced Ms. Jones' name as a middle name of the child. 
This Court's decision in Hutchinson is not related to or dependent upon what courts 
in New Jersey, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, or Colorado may do in terms of undermining 
the rights of natural parents in favor of non-parents. This Court can and should dispose of 
this case in Cheiyl Barlow's favor based solely upon Hutchinson. The fact that Ms. Jones 
is not a step-parent provides an even more compelling reason. In no event, however, will 
Utah statutory or common law allow this Court to treat Ms. Jones better than the step-parent 
in Hutchinson. 
POINT HI 
APPLICATION OF IN LOCO PARENTIS?IN THIS CASE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In her brief Ms. Jones cites several recent State court rulings holding that a parent who 
allows a non-parent to establish a parent-like relationship with their child effectively waives 
their Constitutional rights to control the child's future association with that person. (See 
Appellee's Br. 26-27). However, such a ruling in this particular case would conflict with 
long-standing United States Supreme Court precedent that an individual cannot waive a 
fundamental Constitutional right unintentionally, or without full knowledge that her actions 
constitute a waiver. It would also violate Ms. Barlow's due process rights because Utah law 
did not put her on notice of such a drastic and far-reaching legal harm. 
The U.S. Supreme Court defines waiver as the ^intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), 
Barker v. Williams, 407 U.S. 514, 526 (1973). The High Court has repeatedly held that, 
when confronted with circumstances in which a waiver could be inferred from an 
individual's actions or inaction, courts should "Indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver" and should never "Presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Id., 
Atena Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937), Ohio Bell Telephone Co., v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307(1937). In criminal cases, for example, the 
Court has held that a defendant cannot waive his right to counsel unless there is both an 
explicit offer of counsel and an intelligent rejection of the offer. Carnely v. Cochran, 369 
U.S. 506, 515 (1962). (Emphasis Added). "Anything less is not a waiver." Id. 
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly held that 
a fit legal parent has a fundamental Constitutional right to control the associations of her 
minor children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000); Hardinger v. Scott, 94 P.3d 
252,257 (Utah 2004). To waive this right Ms. Barlow would have had to have been put on 
notice, prior to entering into her extra-legal parenting arrangement with Ms. Jones, that Utah 
law would grant parental rights to Ms. Jones once their relationship ended. It is a 
fundamental principal of Due Process that a person cannot suffer legal harm unless existing 
law is sufficiently clear to put a reasonable person on notice that legal harm will result from 
one's actions. Utah v. Germanto, 73 P.3d. 978, 981 (Utah 2003), Groyned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-109 (1972). The Supreme Court has more specifically held that 
absent sufficient warning, there is no consent to the loss of fundamental constitutional rights. 
Ohio Bell, 301 U.S. at 307. 
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It is undisputed that Cheryl Barlow never fathomed that Utah law would grant Ms. 
Jones parenting rights once their relationship ended. See R. 389, f 4. No Utah court has ever 
applied the in loco parentis doctrine to a child parented by a lesbian partner within an 
unrecognized cohabitating relationship. To the contrary, Utah case law evidences a clear 
disapproval of homosexual partnerships. Tucker v. Tucker, 910P.2d 1209,1213 (Utah 1996), 
Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 643-45(Utah 1980). Utah statutes also indicate Utah's 
unmistakable preference that children be raised in single parent homes rather than in homes 
with cohabiting non-marital partners. Utah Code Ann. 78-30-l(3)(ii)(b), 78-30-9(3)(a). If 
anything, Utah's adoption statute indicates that Utah law preferred that Ms. Barlow's and Ms. 
Jones' parenting relationship end and that Ms. Barlow raise Gracie in a single parent home. 
In any event, neither Utah case law nor statutory law gave Ms. Barlow any warning that 
she was relinquishing any fundamental legal rights as Grade's natural mother by entering into 
an unofficial co-parenting relationship with Ms. Jones. In fact, she had every reason to believe 
that Utah law would completely ignore their unofficial parenting arrangement. She certainly 
did not have enough warning to execute an informed and intelligent waiver of her 
Constitutional rights. 
Indeed, there is significant evidence that both Ms. Barlow and Ms. Jones were keenly 
aware that Utah law ignored, and would continue to ignore, their extra-legal parenting 
relationship. The purpose of establishing Ms. Jones' legal guardianship over Gracie was to 
overcome Ms. Jones' acknowledged lack of legal authority to parent Gracie, or to become her 
guardian in case of Ms. Barlow's death. The fact that Ms. Barlow took legal steps to insure 
that her (then current) wish that Ms. Jones function as Grade's guardian is irrefutable 
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evidence that she perceived Utah's law as not recognizing their unofficial parenting 
arrangement. Moreover, Utah law further gives a fit natural mother the right to terminate a co-
guardianship at any time, regardless of whether doing so is in the "best interests of the child" 
as determined by a court. See V.K.Sv. C.S., 63 P.3d 1284, 1290 (2003). This legal posture 
broadcasts the unequivocal message that Utah law zealously protects the rights of fit legal 
parents against all interested third parties, including the state. 
Given these facts, this Court cannot reasonably conclude that when their parenting 
relationship began, existing Utah law afforded Ms. Barlow with actual or constructive notice 
that their arrangement constituted a waiver of her fundamental constitutional rights as a parent. 
Given the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, 
and its longstanding insistence that Due Process requires the law to provide sufficient notice 
of impending legal harm, this court should acknowledge Ms. Barlow's retained fundamental 
rights to control her daughter's associations, and refuse to apply contraiy foreign state case 
law. 
A fit natural parent retains the right to determine the associations of her child absent the 
state's compelling state interest and employing the least restrictive means. See Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-201(2) (2005); m&Appel v. Appel, 
2005 Wash. LEXIS 356 (April 7, 2005). Given the high strict scrutiny standard applicable to 
this case, this Court cannot accept Ms. Jones' invitation to find a waiver of Cheiyl Barlow's 
fundamental rights. 
POINT IV 
THE VISITATION ORDER VIOLATES FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Appellee incorrectly claims that Cheryl Barlow did not raise below the issues that her 
First Amendment rights to privacy, association, and religious expression are violated by the 
Court's visitation order. In fact, these issues, although combined in the general right of a fit 
parent to raise their children as they choose, were raised throughout the proceedings. 
In Cheryl Barlow's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss brought at the close 
of the Plaintiffs case in the first trial on October 18, 2004 she asserted, 
The common law concept of in loco parentis is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution as applied to this case in that it violates Defendant's substantive due 
process rights to make associationaL religious, and child-rearing decisions for her minor 
child. 
R. 630. Emphasis added. In Cheryl Barlow's Trial Memorandum dated November 8,2004, 
she references in paragraph 10 that "The Court has failed to acknowledge Defendant's 
constitutional and statutory presumption that, as a fit parent, she makes child-rearing and 
associational decisions which serve the best interests of her minor child." R. 706. Later in that 
same memorandum, she argues, 
As stated many times, Defendant is a fit custodial parent and the United States and 
State constitutions protect Defendant in making associational decisions for her minor 
child. In addition, however, Defendant also has rights of privacy secured by the First 
Amendment and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
right of privacy is violated when a fit parent if forced to require her minor child to 
associate with a third party. See generally Kazmierazak v. S. Query\ 736 So.2d 106 
(Florida 1999)." 
R. 710-711. Further, in closing argument counsel expressly raised privacy and First 
Amendment issues and stated that such was a separate and additional "ground" relied upon by 
Cheryl Barlow. R. 913, Tr. 175:21 through 176:3. 
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Moreover, prior to the Court entering its final order5 and as part of her motion to stay 
the district court visitation order, Cheryl Barlow raised throughout her memorandum and 
affidavit the fact that her privacy, associational, and religious rights would be violated if the 
visitation order was implemented. See, R. 829-32,834,836,837,839, and 844-45. Ms. Jones 
on pages 30-31 of her brief complains that the issues raised on the Motion to Stay are 
insufficient. However, there was no way for Cheryl Barlow to know that the trial court would 
have ordered visitation on Sunday and that such would escalate to every other Sunday for the 
rest of the child' minority. This issue did not become a factor until the Court entered the final 
order on December 2, 2004. It is surely appropriate to raise on appeal the constitutional 
impact of a court order, especially when the impact on religious convictions could not have 
been fully appreciated prior to the entry of the order. Cheryl Barlow could not have 
reasonable guessed that the order would have impacted her Sunday religious expression and 
her ability to provide religious training to her child before the visitation order was entered. 
Therefore, these issues are properly before this Court. 
In addition to the above, throughout the trial court proceedings, Cheryl Barlow relied 
upon Wisconsin v. Yoder which is undoubtedly one of the seminole cases dealing with the 
combined rights of parents and their religious expression. In several trial court memoranda 
Cheryl Barlow quoted Yoder because the case recognizes 'the traditional interest of parents 
5For unexplained reasons, Cheryl Barlow's affidavit, motion, and memorandum appear on 
the docket as being filed after the Court's order and even after Ms. Jones' reply to the motion. A 
careful look at R. 824, however, shows it was filed at 10:53 a.m. on December 2,2004, while Ms. 
Jones' opposing memorandum was filed at 3:14 p.m. According to the clerk, the Judge signed 
the final order late in the afternoon of December 2. Cheryl Barlow's motion, memorandum, and 
affidavit were also hand-delivered to the Judge early that morning. 
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with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.'' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at214 
and that parents enjoy the right to teach "moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of 
good citizenship." Id. at 233. More recently, United States Supreme Court cases have referred 
to Yoder as a "hybrid case" because both rights of religious freedom and parental rights are 
intertwined and thus provide more protection and strict scrutiny. See 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
In this case, Cheryl Barlow's rights as a parent are intertwined with her religious, 
association, and privacy rights under the First Amendment. It is, therefore, impossible to raise 
one without the other. Although she generally raised her rights to privacy, association, and 
religious expression several times before the trial court, this Court has entertained important 
constitutional issues even if raised for the first time on appeal. See, State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d. 1309 (Utah 1987). Since the rights were generally raised and because the impact on 
Cheiyl Barlow's rights were not known until after the final order was entered, this case 
presents an appropriate opportunity to entertain all First Amendment issues on appeal. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD 
FOR IN LOCO PARENTIS AND FOR THE "BEST INTEREST OF THE 
CHILD" TEST 
A. In Loco Parentis Requires a Two-way Relationship: 
Ms. Jones fails to respond to the fact that no evidence at trial demonstrated that the 
child had a relationship with Ms. Jones. The only evidence found and relied upon by the 
Judge was that Ms. Jones cared for the child. R. 754, ffif 7-8. The Court then inferred from 
this that the child had a relationship or "bond" with Ms. Jones. However, the child could not 
speak. The only evidence in the record regarding how the child reacted towards Ms. Jones was 
submitted by Cheryl Barlow which stated, the last time the child saw Jones in late 2003, she 
asked who Jones was and acted like she did not know her. The minor child never expressed 
any loss or harm from not seeing or having contact with Jones. R. 3 88-92, Affidavit of Cheryl 
Barlow, f 16. This evidence was not rebutted in any manner at trial. To the contrary, Cheryl 
Barlow provided the only evidence on the well-being of the child in relationship to the absence 
of Ms. Jones. 
Obviously if the child had been older, say 5 or 6, more evidence could have possibly 
been admitted regarding the child's feelings and any emotional attachment or lack thereof. To 
some degree, this is appropriate since the grant of standing based upon in loco parentis should 
be based upon a long-term relationship and not less than two years. However, the burden of 
proving that Gracie had a relationship with Ms. Jones was Ms. Jones' to bear in that in loco 
parentis requires not only that the adult love and care for the child, but that the child loves and 
cares for and needs the adult parent figure. One cannot have a one-sided in loco parentis. It 
takes both the child and the adult, not merely that the adult cared for the child and treated the 
child like her own. Ms. Jones did not provide any evidence on this critical element needed to 
prove in loco parentis. This complete absence of proof cannot be "marshaled" because there 
is nothing to marshal. More importantly, the Court applied an incorrect legal standard of in 
loco parentis by failing to require evidence of a mutual two-way relationship. 
B. The Best Interest Test Cannot Be Met with Only Evidence pf a Non-parent's Desire 
to See the Child and Based Upon Her Past Acts of Caring for the Child: 
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Since Ms. Jones is not a parent, the normal presumption that it is in the best interests 
of a child to have substantial time with a parent does not apply. See Utah Code § 30-3-32. 
Instead, the Court would have had to find that the child was not doing well or in substantial 
need of visitation with Ms. Jones. At a minimum, Ms. Jones should have introduced evidence 
and the Court should have made a finding of fact that the child would be harmed without 
visitation with Ms. Jones. Interestingly, even most of the foreign-state cases cited by Ms. 
Jones in her brief require a showing of harm to the child before granting rights to a "de facto" 
or "psychological parent." No finding was made by the district court that the child would be 
harmed without contact with Ms. Jones. Instead, the Court merely found that the child would 
"benefit financially and emotionally" from re-establishing the relationship. See R. 781, $ 1. 
The Court, as a matter of law, should have first determined that the child was being denied 
financial and emotional necessities or some how in need of greater support financially and 
emotionally than she was getting. 
The Court's findings of fact regarding the best interest of the child focus exclusively 
upon the childcare-type function performed by Ms. Jones. R. 774-775. While these acts may 
be generally laudable, such acts do not require a court to "re-establish" a relationship with a 
child and they are insufficient to form a basis for concluding that the best interests of the child 
are served by re-establishing visitation. 
At trial, the only evidence bearing on the best interest of the child was obtained through 
Cheryl Barlow's testimony. She testified that one boy she new had no less than seven mother 
figures in his life and she did not want this lifestyle for her daughter. R. 913, Tr. 121:4-13* 
She further testified that there was no relationship at all between Gracie and Ms. Jones and that 
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there had been no contact between the two for over a year and that visitation would be 
"extremely damaging to Grade" and that Gracie would be "completely confused." Id. at Tr. 
125:23 through 126:6. Cheryl was further veiy concerned about the child being confused in 
being re-introduced the a concept of two mommies. 
Prior to the trial court's visitation order, the child was doing very well in all respects 
in the custody and care of Cheryl Barlow and did not have any emotional or physical 
problems. R.388-92, Affidavit of Cheiyl Barlow, \ 17. It was improper as a matter of law for 
the court to proceed to evaluate visitation issues when Ms. Jones failed to demonstrate and the 
Court failed to find that the child was harmed substantially by the termination of the 
relationship between Ms. Jones and the child. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
Appellee admits on one hand that Cheryl Barlow had an absolute right to set aside the 
co-guardianship as the sole natural parent, yet on the other hand claims that such parental 
rights arguments have no place in this present proceeding. However, res judicata bars both 
claims that were litigated and those which could have been. In Re General Determination of 
Water Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Crop., 913 
P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995). Cheryl Barlow was adjudicated as the sole parent and all duties 
and obligations of Ms. Jones were terminated by the entry of the order in the collateral 
proceeding. See R. 386-87. These issues cannot be re-litigated in the present lawsuit. 
Terminating the co-guardianship was akin to terminating parental rights on a lower level. 
Moreover, Ms. Jones fails to provide any authority or argument for why she failed to raise the 
in loco parentis issue in the guardianship proceeding. Ms. Jones has asserted essentially that 
she is a second parent to the child in these proceedings. Such an argument would have been 
relevant in defending against a petition to terminate a co-guardianship. Therefore, all visitation 
claims are barred by res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court admitted it was chartering new territory and it defended such conduct 
by stating that is what Judges are suppose to do. R. 913, Vol. Ill, Tr. 194:3-5. It incorrectly 
relied upon Gribble v. Gribble to the exclusion of other statutes and case law addressing the 
rights of unmarried, non-parents against the rights of natural parents. Under the trial court's 
reasoning, the sanctity of natural blood relationships is diminished, elevating non-marital 
cohabitation above that of marriage in what amounts to an adverse possession of a child. 
The trial court's decision opens a pandora's box that cannot be controlled with coherent 
legal reasoning by begging such as, how long does it take to obtain in loco parentis rights? 
Five years? Two years? Two months? How many mothers can one child have when science 
shows there can only be one? Do live-in boyfriends now have rights to petition for visitation 
of their former girlfriend's child? 
Historically these questions were easy to decide: the rights of a natural fit parent always 
trump the rights of any other person. This Court should affirm the fundamental rights of 
parents to determine associations, religious training, and lifestyles for their children. 
Respectfully Submitted this 5th day July, 2005. 
TRANKD. MYLAR C 
Attorney for Defendant^Lppellant 
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